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Abstract 
 The Ottonian Empire in Germany experienced numerous wars, invasions, and rebellions 
over the course of the tenth century. Because the royal family practiced an itinerant form of rule, 
they established an infrastructure of ecclesiastical establishments that facilitated the royal 
household’s movements and defended the rest of the realm. It was here that the fighting clergy, 
or the bishops and abbots who actually took up military command, became a crucial component 
of the empire’s stability and protection.  
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Introduction 
 The conflicting roles of the early medieval bishop as a spiritual leader and as a military 
commander became an increasingly complex issue in Germany during the tenth century. Under 
the Ottonian dynasty, ecclesiastical magnates played a significant part in the secular 
administration of the kingdom, which frequently included participation in military affairs. 
Despite the numerous Church doctrines forbidding “clerical participation in warring activities,” 
the clergy’s presence on the battlefield by this period in time was not a novel development, 
although it usually was a point of contention between the Catholic Church and the ruling nobility 
that imposed these military duties on religious leaders.1 Various land conquests, civil wars, and 
pagan invasions were a significant part of life in early medieval Europe, and the clergy were so 
involved in worldly affairs that their presence in military matters was inevitable. Following the 
Carolingian tradition in the eighth and ninth centuries, bishops, abbots, and even popes 
participated in the military affairs of the Ottonian Empire.2 The clergy contributed both to the 
defense and the expansion of the empire, and as the royal government relied on their 
ecclesiastical magnates more and more in military affairs, the attitude towards violence and the 
warrior bishop within the German Church itself shifted. In this study, I will focus on the 
development of the fighting clergy in the tenth century and their significance to the stability of 
decentralized Ottonian government. 
Historiography: The Lost Century 
 When examining studies pertaining to the development of the fighting clergy under the 
Ottonians, it is important to understand the context in which the tenth century is viewed in 
                                                          
1 Friedrich Prinz, Klerus und Krieg im Früheren Mittelalter: Untersuchungen zur Rolle der Kirche beim Aufbau der 
Königsherrschaft (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1971), 81. 
2 Ibid., 73-74. 
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modern scholarship. It is often seen as a pivotal point in Western European history, either as a 
continuation of Roman tradition in Late Antiquity or the first true century of the Middle Ages. 
John Howe wrote two articles that discussed the position that the tenth century occupies in the 
grand narrative of European history: “Re-forging the ‘Age of Iron’ Part I: The Tenth Century as 
the End of the Ancient World,” and “Re-forging the ‘Age of Iron’ Part II: The Tenth Century in 
a New Age?” The former article examines the Ottonian Empire and its culture as a continuation 
of (and the end of) the Roman tradition. It was Emperor Constantine who began to bring clergy 
members on military campaigns in the fourth century, although the first bishops who set foot on 
a battlefield did not actually participate in military command, much less in fighting. It was a way 
of boosting morale, favoring his Christian soldiers, and providing them access to religious 
services.3 The passive nature of clergy in warfare was reinforced by the councils in later 
centuries, when bishops were explicitly forbidden to participate in war.4 The importance of 
religion and religious rituals in warfare, however, guaranteed that the clergy were always 
involved with military activity in their regions. In the late eighth and ninth centuries, the 
Frankish kingdom used bishops for military purposes as well. Like Constantine, Charlemagne 
disregarded a separation of Church and State, particularly when it came to military matters.5 It 
was under Charlemagne, however, that the clergy started to appear regularly as active agents in 
military command. The Ottonian dynasty would follow in their footsteps over a century later.6 
For the Ottonians, the continuation of the Roman Empire was nearly synonymous with the 
continuation of their Frankish predecessors.   
                                                          
3 David S. Bachrach, Religion and the Conduct of War c. 300-1215 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2003), 17. 
4 Prinz, Klerus und Krieg, 5. 
5 John Howe, “Re-Forging the ‘Age of Iron’ Part I: The Tenth Century as the End of the Ancient World,” History 
Compass 8.8 (2010), 872. 
6 Bernhard Walter Scholz and Barbara Rogers, trans., Carolingian Chronicles: Royal Frankish Annals and Nithard’s 
Histories (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970), 46.  
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 Also known as the Liudolfings, the Ottonians were originally the ruling family in the 
Frankish duchy of Saxony.7 Henry I was the first of the family to ascend to the throne of the 
easternmost portion of the old Carolingian Empire in 919, aptly named East Francia. While he 
began to expand the kingdom’s territories during his reign through military conquest, it was his 
son, Otto the Great (Otto I), who assumed the title of “Emperor” after invading Italy on behalf of 
Pope John XII in 962.8 His successors, Otto II, Otto III, and Henry II, also bore this title, 
expanding their territories in all directions and creating an empire that rivaled Charlemagne’s. 
The line of succession from Henry I to Otto III passed from father to son, breaking only when 
Otto III died without issue. Henry II, a cousin of the late king, seized power in 1002 and ruled 
until his death in 1024.9 The Salians became the next dynastic family in the eleventh century.10  
 While the height of the Ottonian Empire was in the midst of the tenth century, its origin 
and policies were clearly indebted to the older Frankish empire under the Carolingians in the 
eighth and ninth centuries. It is for this reason that many scholars focus their attention on the rule 
of Charlemagne and the Carolingians when discussing the fighting clergy even during the tenth 
century. Friedrich Prinz, a German medieval historian, wrote a book in 1971 called Klerus und 
Krieg im Früheren Mittelalter: Untersuchungen zur Rolle der Kirche beim Aufbau der 
Königsherrschaft (Clergy and War in the Early Middle Ages: Examination of the Role of the 
Church in the Construction of the Monarchy). Prinz’s book is a cornerstone for any modern 
scholar examining the clergy’s military involvement in the early medieval period.11 According to 
                                                          
7 See Appendix A for a genealogy chart of the Liudolfing family. 
8 David S. Bachrach, Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2012), 62. 
9 Henry Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos in Ottonian Germany: The View from Cologne (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 1. 
10 The Ottonians and the Salians were often grouped together on account of their similar policies, particularly in 
regards to their relationship to the Church. For this purpose, however, I will not be discussing the Salian dynasty in 
order to focus on the developments of the tenth century, specifically. Prinz, Klerus und Krieg, 91. 
11 Bernard Bachrach, Rev. of Klerus und Krieg im Früheren Mittelalter: Untersuchungen zur Rolle der Kirche beim  
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Prinz, the concept of milites Christi was an allegory that meant for the clergy to lead their flocks 
(or armies) to spiritual salvation, though it was used in the literal sense as Charlemagne took 
advantage of its literal interpretation to press higher clergy members, particularly bishops, into 
military service. While this could mean that they had to provide soldiers and provisions from 
their household, it could also mean active military service for the clergy member himself.12 
Charlemagne’s efforts to institutionalize the bishops and abbots in the political sphere of the 
empire coincided with the “aristocrat-ization” of the Church.13 The increasing presence of 
nobility in the ranks of the higher clergy meant that these individuals held obligations to both 
their lord and the Church. By appealing to their aristocratic duties, these men started to appear in 
the military history of the Carolingian Empire.  
 Prinz focuses his research on the emergence of the fighting clergy in the eighth and ninth 
centuries, a symptom of the larger integration of religious institutions and the government into a 
Reichskirchensystem, or “Imperial Church system.”14 The consolidation of the lands of the clergy 
under the central government helped Charlemagne maintain control over his empire. The 
Ottonian empire would also use this system to establish control. But the generalized assumption 
that the clergy in tenth-century East Francia had the same function as the newly recruited clergy 
of the eighth and ninth centuries takes too far a step. The Ottonians, controlling a similarly large 
swath of territory on the eastern borders of Christendom, ruled in an itinerant fashion, traveling 
regularly throughout the kingdom to maintain order. Their new system now relied on the support 
of religious institutions to house and provide for them, and to keep their authority when they 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Aufbau der Königsherrschaft, The Catholic Historical Review (1974), 479. 
12 Prinz, Klerus und Krieg, 73-113. 
13 Ibid., 39. 
14 Ibid., 91. 
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moved on.15 Prinz’s argument fails to examine the fighting clergy under the Ottonians in a new 
cultural context that accounts for their geographical shift and development over time.  
 Other historians have taken the stance of Howe’s second article, which sees the influence 
of the Carolingians and the Ottonians as the start of a new era in the High Middle Ages. Another 
German scholar, Leopold Auer, addressed the fighting clergy under the Ottonians in an article 
called “Der Kriegsdienst des Klerus unter den sächsischen Kaisern” (“The Military Obligations 
of the Clergy under the Saxon Emperors”), also written in 1971. The article discussed the various 
bishops and abbots that fought in the wars of the Ottonian period, focusing on the culmination of 
the Reichskirchensystem and the exploitation of the fighting clergy in the eleventh century under 
Henry II.16 He pinpointed the western duchy of Lotharingia as the area in which the fighting 
clergy really became a standard presence in military conflicts. In all of the wars that the Ottonian 
Empire fought, the concentration of bishops in active and critical positions of command were 
higher in the West and in the South during the Italian campaigns, and this number of active 
participants rose dramatically from the campaigns of Otto the Great to the wars of Henry II. The 
late Ottonian and Salian period in the eleventh century saw a peak in the Holy Roman Empire’s 
power over the Church and a subsequent backlash by the papacy and many local ecclesiastical 
institutions during the Investiture Controversy.17 Largely quantitative, Auer’s article is a 
wonderful resource for looking at the trends of the fighting clergy from the later tenth century to 
the eleventh century, but, like Prinz, he does not examine the Church’s role in tenth-century 
Ottonian warfare in its own context.  
                                                          
15 John W. Bernhardt, Itinerant Kingship and Royal Monasteries in Early Medieval Germany, c. 936-1075 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 56-60. 
16 Leopold Auer, “Der Kriegsdienst des Klerus unter den sächsischen Kaisern,” Mitteilungen des Instituts  
für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 79 (1971): 316-407.   
17 I.S. Robinson, introduction to Eleventh-Century Germany: The Swabian Chronicles, trans. I.S. Robinson 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 18. 
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 Both studies by these German scholars are cited by many contemporary authors, but they 
are now quite outdated.18 A number of English-language scholars have since studied the military 
exploits of the Ottonians, which has put a new emphasis on the importance of the contributions 
of the earlier Ottonian kings, namely Henry I and Otto I. David S. Bachrach and Bernard 
Bachrach have studied the contributions of Henry I in particular and his implementation of 
fortress systems and the use of local levies, which led to the “Saxon military revolution” of 
siege-style warfare.19 This style of warfare, which was especially visible on the eastern and 
northern borders of the German kingdom, was worth comparing to the corresponding importance 
of the clergy in warfare, as many of these clergy members organized the defense of cities and 
fortresses rather than participating in open battle.20 Fortresses and fortified cities made up the 
military infrastructure of the German kingdom, which expanded as the empire grew, was 
monitored and manned by royal ecclesiastical households. The geographical placement of royal 
monasteries and the location of loyal bishops in relation to areas of conflict within the empire 
dictated the role of the fighting clergy, particularly when one considers that the Ottonians relied 
on a form of itinerant kingship. 
Sources 
Surviving primary sources of the tenth century are few and far between. Few of the 
common legal documents and letters of the laity in the tenth century still exist today, and the 
ones that did survive destruction were almost always written by the Church and commissioned 
                                                          
18 It should be noted that there is more German scholarship on this topic; however, due to limited resources and 
time, I have only thoroughly examined these two studies to supplement my research in the English language. 
19 B.S. Bachrach and D. Bachrach, “Saxon Military Revolution, 912-973?: Myth and Reality,” Early Medieval Europe 
15.2 (2007), 219. The Bachrachs offered this argument in opposition to Karl Leyser’s theory that the Ottonians 
were responsible for the introduction of the mounted knight in combat. This development was evident in the 
Carolingian period. 
20 David S. Bachrach, “The Military Organization of Ottonian Germany, c. 900-1018: The Views of Bishop Thietmar 
of Merseburg,” The Journal of Military History 72 (2008), 1071. 
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by the nobility.21  The most common written documents of this era, and the ones that I have 
examined closely, are chronicles, histories, and annals. These genres of medieval text were fairly 
similar. Histories were descriptive accounts that could range from broad to very specific 
subjects, but usually focused on one topic. Chronicles were “temporal narratives” that tended to 
share similarities with annals, which were brief compilations of historical events, usually 
recorded by year.22 The distinction between these genres were not completely separate in the 
tenth century, as the works produced became more descriptive and detailed in regards to military 
and political matters. Two works that I have examined closely are Deeds of the Saxons by 
Widukind of Corvey and the Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg. The former is a history from 
the tenth century and the latter is a chronicle from the early eleventh century; despite their 
differences in form, Thietmar relied heavily on Widukind’s history for his own work. These two 
important contemporary authors wrote extensively over Ottonian military history and gave the 
most insight into the evolution of the clergy’s involvement in warfare.  
Widukind of Corvey, a Saxon monk writing in the second half of the tenth century, 
showed a keen interest in the military events of his time. The shift in attitudes towards warfare 
within the clergy may have been a result of the geographical shift of the ruling dynasty to 
Saxony. The Deeds of the Saxons was completed in 973 for Princess Mathilda, the daughter of 
Otto I.23 The work began with the origin of the Saxon people, followed the political and military 
affairs of the Ottonian dynasty starting with Henry I, and ended with the death of Otto I and Otto 
II’s ascension to the throne.  Widukind paid particular attention to the conflicts of Henry and 
                                                          
21 Bachrach, Warfare, 5.  
22 I.S. Robinson, preface to Eleventh Century Germany:  The Swabian Chronicles, trans. I.S. Robinson (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008), vii. 
23 Bernard S. Bachrach and David S. Bachrach, introduction to Deeds of the Saxons, by Widukind of Corvey, trans. 
Bernard S. Bachrach and David S. Bachrach (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), xiii. 
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Otto’s rules, both of which dealt with Hungarian invasions, civil wars, and interventions in the 
West. Widukind had a fairly knowledgeable grasp of military matters. Not only did he come 
from a noble family that would have served in a military capacity, but Corvey itself was also 
required to provide soldiers and military services as a part of their royal obligations.24 His bias 
towards the Saxon rule, courtesy of his own identity as much as the identities of his patrons, led 
him to write about military affairs with some knowledge of the intricacies of war. It also showed 
that the acceptance of violence in the Church began in the tenth century, making the time period 
significant in the larger framework of the development of the legacy of the warrior bishop and 
the fighting clergy. 
The Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg is similarly useful for looking at the evolution 
of the fighting clergy in the late tenth century. Thietmar was the bishop of Merseburg, writing in 
the early eleventh century. Thietmar himself was related to the ruling family on his mother’s 
side.25 He was keenly interested in the military history of the tenth century, keeping careful track 
of sieges and battles. Like Widukind, he was also surrounded by relatives who served in the 
military, and he himself commanded troops on behalf of Henry II.26 His accounts of clergymen 
in battles were written with great pride rather than shame or apathy, and his analysis of military 
organization under ecclesiastical and secular leadership showed that he understood the 
importance of the clergy’s military contributions.27 His acceptance of the presence of men of the 
Church in warfare signifies a normalization of clergy in active duty. Though the political 
motivations and reliability of Widukind, Thietmar, and other authors must always be read with a 
                                                          
24 Bachrach, “Saxon Military Revolution,” 196.  
25 David A. Warner, introduction to Ottonian Germany: The Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg, by Thietmar of 
Merseburg, trans. David A. Warner (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 49. 
26 Bachrach, “Military Organization,” 1067. 
27 Thietmar of Merseburg, Ottonian Germany: The Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg, trans. David A. Warner 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 178-179.  
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grain of salt, examining these sources as historical sources and cultural indicators of the society’s 
attitude towards the fighting clergy is invaluable. 
Argument 
 In this study, I will argue that the importance and the acceptance of the fighting clergy 
under the Ottonians in the tenth century was the result of the military and administrative policies 
implemented by Henry I, Otto I, and their predecessors. By developing an itinerant form of rule 
through the Reichskirchensystem, the Ottonians bestowed considerable economic and military 
power on ecclesiastical magnates in order to govern effectively and protect the kingdom. The 
parallel development of  siege warfare  and the increasing number of fortifications encouraged 
the participation of the clergy in military defense in every area of the kingdom. The number of 
recorded clergy members actually taking up military command increased drastically over the 
course of the century, particularly in areas that were not frequented by the king or occupied by 
his loyal secular vassals. Because their involvement in warfare in these areas was crucial to the 
survival of the empire, the integration of secular military duty into the duties of the clergy was 
met with increasing acceptance in the tenth century. 
Outline 
In my first chapter, I will discuss the development of the Reichskirchensystem as the 
foundation for the  institutionalization of the fighting clergy under the itinerant kingship of the 
Ottonians. The Carolingian kings implemented the concept of royal monasteries and an imperial 
church system, but the Ottonians reinvented this practice by creating an extensive network of 
ecclesiastical institutions through which to extend their rule. Among increasing secular 
obligations was the Burgbann, which charged monasteries with the upkeep of the ever-important 
12 
 
fortifications that spanned the kingdom. In my second chapter, I examine the major conflicts of 
the Ottonian Empire of the tenth century and trace the presence of the fighting clergy in each 
region of the empire, as well as their role in the numerous rebellions that cropped up. The 
military presence of the clergy increased in each region of the empire towards the end of the 
tenth century, but they became essential in areas left unfrequented by the king; the only region in 
which this did not happen was in Saxony, the favored destination of the ruling family. The third 
chapter closely examines the primary sources of Widukind and Thietmar, along with a selection 
of other works, to understand how the fighting clergy was perceived during the tenth century. 
The attitude towards the fighting clergy developed alongside its importance; by the time 
Thietmar was writing in the early eleventh century, violence perpetrated by the clergy was a 
normal subject and the warrior bishop was a heroic figure. This, of course, was the view of a 
man who was in the heart of the empire; eleventh-century authors in Lotharingia tended to 
portray them in a more modest light, and the chroniclers of the later eleventh century would start 
to turn their gaze away from the empire and towards the papal seat in Rome. The general attitude 
towards the fighting clergy, however, had shifted dramatically during the tenth century. 
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Chapter 1: The Ottonian Reichskirchensystem 
In order to understand how essential the fighting clergy were to the Ottonian Empire in 
particular, one must examine the larger context in which they were situated. The intricate 
relationship between the Ottonian State and the ecclesiastical institutions throughout the realm 
provided the modus operandi through which the kings of the tenth century could exercise 
military, economic, and religious control. The royal family granted land and privileges to key 
monasteries and bishoprics in exchange for supplies, religious benefits, and military power, 
which allowed the Ottonians to bypass the various aristocratic families within their territory. 
With the increasing importance of siege warfare, the military capabilities of the clergy became 
paramount in the defense of the realm. This system, which tied the royal court to the Church on a 
political and personal level, was partially the reason that the fighting clergy of the tenth century 
were crucial to the survival of the Ottonian Empire.  
Carolingian Origins 
The origins of the Reichskirchensystem in the Frankish kingdoms were present from the 
beginning of Carolingian rule under Charles Martell in 718.1 Before the Carolingian family 
assumed royal control over the Frankish kingdoms from the Merovingians, the bishops of the 
Frankish regions had considerably more control over their episcopates. Charles Martell and 
Pippin III, Charlemagne’s grandfather and father respectively, began to consolidate power from 
the clergy by confiscating land and reducing their power over local monasteries by granting these 
monasteries to loyal followers and allowing them greater independence through the secular 
                                                          
1 Rosamond McKitterick, The Frankish Kingdoms under the Carolingians, 751-987 (New York: Longman Group 
Limited, 1983), 31.—Charles Martel technically held the title of Mayor of the Palace while the Merovingian dynasty 
held the title of king, but he essentially ruled the kingdom. His son Pippin III was the first Carolingian to hold the 
title of king. 
14 
 
government.2 By doing so, these institutions became more indebted to the king even as they 
expanded their own economic and political power. Bishops, however, already had access to 
independence and wealth. While the Merovingians lacked a powerful central government, the 
Carolingians aspired to consolidate power and saw the independent bishops as a threat. This 
resulted in an attempt to remove their secular power and material wealth.3 As a result, the 
monasteries previously under their control assumed a more favorable role in the royal 
government.4 The Carolingians received the support of these royal monasteries by granting these 
immunities and privileges, but they also wielded the power of appointment. For some 
ecclesiastical institutions, the best way to ensure loyalty was to grant abbacies to loyal 
followers.5 The abundance of lay abbots, as well as Pippin III’s increasing secularization of 
Church property, was controversial, but this trend continued through Charlemagne and the 
Ottonians.6  
In the ninth century, the Carolingians took the royal control of the Church a step further. 
Under Charlemagne and Louis the Pious, monasteries, churches, and bishoprics that were 
granted immunity were also under royal protection, strengthening the bond between the royal 
household and the ecclesiastical institutions in the realm.7 In exchange for these benefits were 
various obligations to the king and to the state, which ranged from religious services to supplying 
                                                          
2 Ibid., 42-43. 
3 Friedrich Prinz, Klerus und Krieg im Früheren Mittelalter: Untersuchungen zur Rolle der Kirche beim Aufbau der 
Königsherrschaft (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1971, 64-65. 
4 McKitterick, Frankish Kingdoms, 37. 
5 Ibid., 41. 
6 John W. Bernhardt, Itinerant Kingship and Royal Monasteries in Early Medieval Germany, c. 936-1075 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 29.Immunities gave ecclesiastical institutions the right to oversee 
their own affairs, allowing them a certain degree of independence from local secular authorities. Only special 
immunities, however, granted them the right to independent elections, as the Ottonians usually had a hand in 
selecting new abbots, abbesses, and bishops. 
7 Ibid., 29. 
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military retinues.8 The general term for obligations owed by the region’s abbots and bishops to 
the crown was called servitium regis, a term Friedrich Prinz also used to refer directly to the 
military obligations of the high clergy.9 In addition to general administrative and economic 
benefits, Charlemagne required the bishops and abbots of his kingdom to perform military 
service as a part of these legal obligations to the kingdom. 
It was Charlemagne, according to Prinz, who fully institutionalized the role of the clergy 
in his kingdom, in political as well as military matters. Past Carolingian rulers were more 
sensitive to the complaints of the ecclesiastical reformers and only called their bishops out for 
spiritual guidance and religious services.10 Charlemagne, however, took advantage of the fact 
that many members of the high clergy were also members of the nobility, appealing to their 
aristocratic backgrounds to convince them to participate in military service.11 The Church issued 
several prohibitions over the years in an attempt to prevent this, each one emphasizing the ban on 
weapons and active military participation, but these had little effect on the secular government.12 
Loopholes also existed; the Admonitio generalis in 789, for example, banned the lower clergy 
such as priests and deacons from using weapons, but the higher clergy, namely bishops and 
abbots, were not mentioned.13 Despite resistance from the Church and the individual clergymen 
affected by these military obligations, bishops still appeared in battle. Even so, resistance to this 
change was still palpable. As late as 895 in the Synod of Tribur, prayers and offerings were 
banned for any clergy members who had fallen in battle or in a fight.14 Although the Church’s 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 30. 
9 Prinz, Klerus und Krieg, 79. 
10 David S. Bachrach, Religion and the Conduct of War c. 300-1215 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2003), 34. 
11 Ibid., 73-74. 
12 Ibid., 83. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 26. 
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views of the warrior bishops changed tentatively over the course of the tenth century, writers 
shied away from the depiction of these men in actual violent conflict.  
Despite debates and contradictions between Church doctrine and the reality of warfare, a 
glaring exception to the rule existed in the form of defense against pagan enemies. Northern 
Europe was wracked with constant Viking attacks in the early Middle Ages. The Frankish kings 
constantly fought with the pagan peoples of Saxony and Bavaria, whom Charlemagne conquered 
and converted much the same as the Saxons themselves would do to the Slavs.15 When the 
enemy was non-Christian, the attitude towards the holy men who fought against them was much 
more positive.16 In many cases, a bishop’s violent actions in warfare could be dismissed on the 
grounds that the enemy was non-Christian. This mentality persisted into the tenth century, even 
though a large number of bishops in the Ottonian period led armies against the Christian armies 
of Western kingdoms, rebellious noblemen, and Roman nobility of the Italian Peninsula.17 Even 
in the east, when the aggressive missionary policies of the Ottonian kings meant that the people 
of Poland and Bohemia were largely Christian by the time Otto III was on the throne, the 
Emperor was sending troops led by Bishop Giselher of Magdeburg to aid a Christian Poland to 
fight against the Christian duchy of Bohemia.18 While the threat of pagan invasions certainly 
encouraged the acceptance of the fighting clergy, other conflicts that could not be so easily 
                                                          
15 Rosamond McKitterick, Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 252-254. Charlemagne defeated and forcibly converted the Saxons in the late eighth century, 
although it took several decades to establish religious institutions in the new territory. 
16 Prinz, Klerus und Krieg, 110-111. It also helped that many of the institutions to the east carried out a lot of 
missionary work. The Slavic invasions many bishops were involved in were generally seen as a rejection of the 
Christian faith.  
17 Leopold Auer, “Der Kriegsdienst des Klerus unter den sächsischen Kaisern,” Mitteilungen des Instituts  
für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 79 (1971), 322. 
18 Thietmar of Merseburg, Ottonian Germany: The Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg, trans. David A. Warner 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 158. Miesco of Poland vs. Boleslav II of Bohemia in 990. 
Technically, Empress Theophanu sent troops to Miesco’s aid, as Otto III was only ten years old at the time. 
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explained by a religious agenda indicated that the institutionalization initiated by the 
Carolingians had a great effect on the clergy of the Ottonian period. 
Renewal under the Ottonians 
The relationship between the Church and State in the tenth century was a much as 
renewal as it was a continuation of the Carolingian tradition. By taking over ecclesiastical 
property and distributing it in order to eliminate the threat of independent bishops in the eighth 
and early ninth centuries, the Carolingians tightened their control over the Church. Subjecting 
bishops to political and military duties also enabled them to bring ecclesiastical authority and 
assets under their influence, which the Ottonian kings imitated in the tenth century. They also 
granted immunities and lands to monasteries and convents as the Carolingians did to build 
relationships with these establishments for spiritual, political and economic benefits. But the 
transition between these two periods was rather disjointed; the consolidation of land and power 
did not last in the west Frankish kingdom. As the Carolingian empire fractured into smaller 
pieces in the ninth century, the royal churches and monasteries in each region remained loyal to 
their sovereign, rather than remaining in a larger network.19 By the time Henry I ascended the 
East Frankish throne 919, the Reichskirchensystem was intact but not nearly as important as it 
once was. The connection between the royal churches in each kingdom was nonexistent, and the 
system as a whole was hardly important to the region’s political stability. When the Ottonians 
came into power, they consolidated older royal monasteries and new establishments to create an 
ecclesiastical network through which they could exercise power. 
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Even though the Ottonians expanded royal monasteries in a continuation of the 
Carolingian tradition, the purpose of this system and its role in administration changed 
drastically in the tenth century. Henry I’s ascension to the throne in East Francia caused a major 
geographical shift eastward in political power. The eastern kingdom originally comprised of the 
duchies of Saxony, Bavaria, and Thuringia, and Franconia, all lands that had recently been 
absorbed by the Carolingians in the last several centuries.20  They had the disadvantage of being 
a new royal family; Henry I was elected by his peers after the death of King Conrad.21 As the 
duke of Saxony and member of the Liudolfing family, Henry I had much support within his own 
duchy, but various rebellions and civil wars against their rule in other regions of East Francia in 
the coming years suggested that the legitimacy of the royal family was not entirely 
unquestionable.22 In order to impose their rule, the royal family had to exercise military power in 
each region of the kingdom. Saxony, however, had no central administrative capital like 
Charlemagne’s empire had. Aachen still retained symbolic significance for the Ottonians, but it 
was located so far west in Lower Lotharingia that its power as a central administrative center no 
longer existed.23 With no political infrastructure to rely on, Henry I and his descendants were 
forced to become mobile in order to impose their rule. It was with this itinerant form of 
administration in mind that the Ottonians rebuilt a network of royal Churches. 
                                                          
20 Henry Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos in Ottonian Germany: The View from Cologne (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 2. 
21 Simon Maclean, trans, History and Politics in Late Carolingian and Ottonian Europe: The Chronicle of  
Regino of Prüm and Adalbert of Magdeburg (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 235. Conrad was 
the Duke of Franconia before he too was elected king of East Francia in 911. He was not related to either the 
Carolingians or Henry I. 
22 David S. Bachrach, Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2012), 17-19. Henry I 
had to establish control over the nobility in Swabia and Bavaria immediately through military campaigns after his 
election  as king. He also had to intervene in Lotharingia several times after he acquired it in 923. 
23 Every Ottonian king in the tenth century was crowned in Aachen, as per Carolingian custom. The only exception 
was Henry II, who seized power after Otto III’s sudden death in 1002. He was crowned in Werla. Thietmar, 
Chronicon, 207. 
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The itinerant nature of the Ottonian kings in the tenth century was one of the most well-
known characteristics of tenth-century Germany. This direct method of overseeing the 
kingdom—the king’s physical presence and authority—differed greatly from the earlier Frankish 
method. While Charlemagne and his relatives used ecclesiastical magnates to handle 
administration and maintain a working infrastructure, the Carolingian kings did not move around 
so frequently.24 The Ottonians reestablished these Carolingian royal monasteries, such as the 
monastery of Corvey, which was located in the central zone of between West and East Francia.25 
On the eastern frontier, they built new monasteries to accommodate the royal household.26 
Between them, they constructed and maintained a network of roads that allowed them to travel 
through their territories with ease. John W. Bernhardt specified three “triangles” of frequently 
visited locations, which encircled the most important regions of the German empire. The first, 
inherited from the Carolingian kings, was Aachen, Nijmegen, and Cologne, all within the duchy 
of Lower Lotharingia.27 The second triangle, located in Franconia, consisted of Frankfurt, 
Ingelheim, and Worms. Frankfurt was also a city favored by the Carolingians. The third area, 
however, was located in Eastern Saxony, and included Magdeburg, Merseburg, and 
Gandersheim.28 The triumvirate of transit zones covered three crucial areas of administration and 
allowed the central part of the empire to encompass a large part of Saxony, which persevered 
even during the reign of the Salian emperors in the eleventh century.29 This study pinpointed the 
                                                          
24 Bernhardt, Itinerant Kingship, 48. 
25 Ibid., 195-196. 
26 Ibid., 51. 
27 The Duchy of Lower Lotharingia, or Lower Lorraine, was actually further north than the Duchy of Upper 
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20 
 
favored destinations and residences of the king during peacetime; in times of conflict, of course, 
the king traveled as far as Rome and Gaul if the need arose. The areas of Bavaria, Swabia, Upper 
Lotharingia, and Northern Saxony, however, were infrequently visited by the royal household 
unless it was specifically for a campaign.30  
The royal family naturally gravitated towards Saxony and the east, even when they were 
frequently moving. The religious landscape of the eastern frontier was under-developed 
compared to the kingdom’s western territories, which had a number of well-established 
monasteries and dioceses.31 Considering that the Saxons had recently converted to Christianity in 
the late eighth century, there was not much to work with.32 The Saxon kings took this 
opportunity to found a number of new religious establishments in the east, including the convent 
of Quedlinburg in Walbeck in 936, as well as the monastery of St. Maurice in Magdeburg in 
937.33 These new monasteries shifted ecclesiastical power east, but they also served as several of 
the favorite residences and strongholds of the Ottonian dynasty.34 This network of royal 
monasteries served as a physical infrastructure through which the royal household could travel 
and depend on for economic and military support.35  
The royal family strengthened their relationship with these eastern monasteries further by 
installing their own relatives. Many of the rulers of these ecclesiastical households in the tenth 
century were directly related to the Liudolfing family. Not only were male relatives of the king 
favored for positions in the clergy, but royal women also held positions of power within 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 66. 
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important royal convents. Quedlinburg and the convent of Gandersheim, both of which Otto I, 
Otto II and Otto III frequently visited, were ruled by Ottonian princesses in the tenth century. 
Quedlinburg “maintained the right of advocacy for the Liudolfing family,”36 and a number of 
royal women entered this convent, including Otto’s sister and his daughter Mathilda. Princess 
Mathilda, who acted as regent for her father in Saxony, was the abbess of Quedlinburg from 966 
to 999.37 Otto III’s sister Sophie was the Abbess of Gandersheim at the turn of the century.38 The 
close familial connections between the king and the various royal leaders of his realm 
encouraged a stronger infrastructure that did not rely on the local nobility for economic or 
political power. Although the Ottonians had much more success installing their relatives and 
loyal candidates in positions of ecclesiastical power in Saxony than in other duchies, especially 
towards the end of the tenth century, the relationship between the royal family and their royal 
monasteries was crucial when traveling through various regions to take care of invasions in the 
east, civil rebellions, and other crises that occurred. 
The reason for the family’s commitment to the foundation and upkeep of monasteries and 
convents was, of course, not entirely secular; the religious benefits of the royal monasteries were 
a significant element in the relationship between the royal household and the imperial Church. 
But even religious benefits had a military and political significance. Even though the 
Carolingians pushed the traditional limits of the clergy by requiring them to take a more active 
role in warfare, they still performed prayers and religious services on the ruler’s behalf that 
ensured their spiritual and political security. The Carolingian kings projected the image of sacral 
kingship through lavish coronation ceremonies celebrating unction, which effectively legitimized 
                                                          
36 Ibid., 139. 
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their rule of both secular and religious matters.39 The Ottonian dynasty, which had to build their 
influence on the church from scratch, eventually took on this mantle of divine authority as well. 
Henry I refused unction, much to Thietmar’s disappointment.40 Otto I was anointed, however, as 
were his successors. As each successive king contributed to the growing power of the Church, 
the image of the king as the “elect of God” became increasingly important.41 For the Ottonians, 
their constant travel from one monastery to another once the network had been established 
promoted the legitimacy of their rule through the Christian faith. 
Aside from the Ottonians' constant attempts install their own candidates to positions of 
leadership, monasteries and bishoprics had considerable power and independence during the 
tenth century. Royal monasteries boasted independence from taxes and the jurisdiction of local 
nobility. The king could also grant them the rights to various properties and the incomes from 
taxes on local markets, boosting their economic value.42 These benefits were granted on the basis 
of servitium regis, but more privileges the monastery had, the greater obligations they owed to 
the kingdom. The monasteries were required to provide supplies and lodging for the king and his 
retinue, which could include entire armies. Several royal monasteries frequented by Otto I built 
or owned royal quarters for this very purpose.43 The supplies set aside for secular purposes were 
distinct; most of the lands granted to monasteries were distinguished between the abbot or 
abbess’s lands and the lands that belonged to the monastery or church. The king would draw on 
supplies from these private lands, just as he relied on the abbots’ service in war rather than the 
                                                          
39 John Howe, “Re-forging the Age of Iron Part II: The Tenth Century in a New Age?” History Compass 8.9 (2010), 
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40 Thietmar, Chronicon, 73. “In the biography of the holy father Ulrich . . . one can read that the holy martyr of 
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lower clergy.44 The clear distinction between secular and ecclesiastical did not entirely avoid 
disputes between the Church and State about the proper use of the land, but it did separate the 
role of the Abbot (or Abbess) from the rest of the group. The role of the abbot became 
increasingly secular, particularly in the case of lay abbots, who were loyal vassals of the king 
rewarded with the leadership of a monastery.45 While both lay abbots and ‘regular’ abbots were 
expected to serve the kingdom and even participate in military campaigns, lay abbots also held 
secular roles that influenced their actions as clerical leaders.46 Before Henry I’s ascension to 
kingship, for example, his father Otto, the Duke of Saxony was also the Lay Abbot of Hersfeld 
and used his position to seize the monastery’s land for his own use.47 The clear connection 
between secular and ecclesiastical authority was naturally an unpopular subject among the 
Church; not only were these religious leaders directly influenced by the king, but in several 
instances, they held their secular offices at the same time.  
One of the most important services the monasteries performed for the royal itinerary was 
the Burgbann. This was a legal obligation that required local estates to maintain fortresses 
necessary to the defense of the royal entourage.48 Bernhardt specified that Burgbann grants 
directly related to the maintenance and protection of the path of the royal itinerary within the 
empire, but various bishoprics and monasteries also protected fortresses built for external 
defense, especially on the eastern and northern frontier. These obligations were not always 
carried out by the dependents of the ecclesiastical authority—many institutions were favored by 
the King and while the ecclesiastical leaders had authority over the military mobilization of the 
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48 Ibid., 57. 
24 
 
area, they drew their manpower from secular districts outside of their own estates.49 The 
dependents were protected under immunities granted by the king. Although the resources under 
all households were crucial to the military infrastructure, the Ottonian rulers gave the most 
authority to their religious followers.  
Military Obligations of the Clergy 
 Because ecclesiastical establishments included large swaths of land that were inhabited 
by laymen, they were responsible for a large amount of people who owed the state military 
service. While the scarcity of actual military legislation from the tenth century has seriously 
inhibited the study of the precise military tactics of the Ottonian Empire, David Bachrach used 
Thietmar’s Chronicon to construct a model of tenth-century military organization.50 While the 
study does not claim to be complete, Bachrach identifies a “three-part organization” of military 
forces that are based on Thietmar’s own observations and his familiarity with ninth-century 
military models; another continuation of Carolingian tradition in the tenth century. These three 
sections were the military households of secular and ecclesiastical magnates, regional 
expeditionary levies, and local levies.51 Military households and expeditionary levies were used 
for campaigns, but all levels of military organization were used to maintain defenses, especially 
because siege warfare was such a dominant style of warfare. While lesser clergy were not 
allowed to handle weapons or participate in warfare, the laymen under the jurisdiction of 
monasteries and bishoprics were a part of the estate’s military household, which the king could 
call upon when needed.52 These professional soldiers were often used to supplement the king’s 
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own royal military household, or to defend the region when the king was not present. In this 
case, the local magnates commanded them. This was especially true on eastern frontiers, where 
both ecclesiastical and secular leaders were responsible for defenses, even serving jointly to 
defend one fortress.53 These magnates also led expeditionary levies, which served outside of 
their home duchies, usually to serve in far-reaching regions such as Italy and the eastern 
frontier.54 
 One of the crowning military achievements of the Ottonians in the tenth century was the 
implementation of agrarii milites, or the use of local manpower for military operations.55 During 
a nine-year peace treaty with the Hungarians, Henry I began to secure older Carolingian 
fortresses and built new ones. He trained men from local levies to live in and maintain these 
fortifications; this was the start of the Burgbann.56 The addition of local defenders alongside a 
proper army improved military power in a way that was conducive to the itinerant nature of the 
Ottonian Empire, gaining local militia where they were needed and leaving them behind to 
continue defense when leadership was needed elsewhere. The increasing use of fortifications and 
siege warfare in the tenth century meant that the Ottonians now relied on local secular and 
ecclesiastical strongholds to secure the realm. The king was able to travel to areas that required 
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his attention, leaving others to man the rest of the realm through a series of fortifications.57 The 
most common form of military service performed by ecclesiastical households was the 
maintenance and defense of fortresses. 
Although bishoprics were not included in this intricate method of travel, they were 
subject to this integration of the secular and the religious in this system as well, especially in a 
military context. Although the early Carolingians limited the power of the bishoprics, later 
Carolingian rulers and their Ottonian successors would increase their power and privilege once 
they were firmly in the sphere of royal influence. Bishops were still an integral part of the 
kingdom, and controlled a considerable amount of land, wealth, and manpower. Like the abbots 
and abbesses of the royal monasteries, many bishops of the tenth century had blood ties to the 
royal family. Brun of Cologne was one such example, holding the title of Archbishop and the 
Duke of Lotharingia in order to keep the troublesome area under control for his brother.58 
Although the dual position concerned some, his ability to hold both offices illustrated the 
ambiguity of the ecclesiastical and secular offices held by ecclesiastical leaders who were often 
nobility. Like the abbots of these royal institutions, bishops could also be expected to contribute 
military resources and to lead the men they provided into battle.59  
The clergymen who actually commanded troops were most conspicuous participants of 
the Reichskirchensystem. The ancient ban on the use of weapons had been repeated over and 
over, and despite modifications, the official stance of the Church was still against the use of 
weapons. The Capitularia missorum specialia in 802 banned priests and deacons from using 
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weapons, although members of the high clergy, namely bishops and abbots, were not specified.60 
The Carolingian government faced stubborn opposition from some of their subjects on the 
matter. During and after the tenth century, however, the presence of bishops on the battlefields 
was recorded with little comment. While outright violence was still taboo, the presence of the 
cleric on the battlefield was neither odd nor shameful by the time Thietmar of Merseburg wrote 
his Chronicon. This extreme requirement of servitium regis was not immediately a common 
occurrence in the early years of the Ottonian empire, but the framework of royal churches and 
secular duties allowed the fighting clergy to become so efficient and systemized. 
The earlier Saxon kings lay the foundation for this system, and role of the clergy became 
progressively more important until its culmination under Henry II. The last Ottonian emperor 
used the Reichskirchensystem to its full potential. His close relationship to the papacy and his 
increasing reliance on bishops to perform secular services actually allowed the last Ottonian 
emperor to form a more centralized government, based in Merseburg.61 Stepping away from an 
itinerant form of rule made the administrative functions of the ecclesiastical magnates essential 
to the defense of the realm, although it was clear that Henry II still traveled frequently on the 
same routes as his predecessors to address military conflicts as far away as Frisia.62 In this 
respect, Henry II still relied on the infrastructure of his predecessors to support his army. 
Conclusion 
 The Ottonian Reichskirchensystem was not a new innovation, but the kings of the tenth 
century revived and expanded the role of the clergy in secular affairs to the degree that they were 
essential to running the empire. They established new monasteries and convents and favored 
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existing ones to build up a physical network of loyal households that would enable the monarch 
to travel the kingdom, provide military and economic support, and offered religious services for 
the family. The required military service was a part of the increasing secular duties of the bishop 
and the abbot, who often came from an aristocratic background, which made their involvement 
in war more valuable. Because bishoprics and monasteries controlled so much land and 
manpower that was free from the influence of local nobility, the Ottonians relied on them to 
carry out military campaigns and defenses. As we will see, the succession of wars and military 
campaigns during the tenth century were almost constant, and the enemies came from all 
directions. In order to protect the empire’s interests, the clergy had to participate in warfare. 
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Chapter 2: The Conflicts of the Tenth Century 
 The extensive infrastructure the Ottonians created for themselves allowed them to launch 
campaigns and defend their borders from every portion of the kingdom. Widukind of Corvey 
commented that “the Saxons were afflicted by many enemies, the Slavs from the east, the Franks 
from the South, the Lotharingians from the west, and the Danes and Slavs from the north.”1 He 
was speaking of the challenges that Henry I faced, but this statement could apply to any of his 
successors. In the west, the Frankish kingdoms erupted into civil war several times, and the 
middle kingdom of Lotharingia became a point of contention between the Franks and the 
Saxons.2 To the east, the Hungarians frequently raided the eastern border of the kingdom. 
Although they also invaded Western Europe though Italy, Saxony and Bavaria took the brunt of 
these raids, making their local defense systems imperative. The Ottonians came into conflict with 
various Slavic tribes as they tried to expand their empire, as well. Like the Frankish kingdoms 
did to their Saxon predecessors, the kings of the tenth century used a combination of military 
might and missionary work to expand their lands eastward.3 To the north, they faced similar 
problems from Danish invaders, who had been terrorizing Northern Europe for several 
centuries.4 Even after Henry I conquered and converted the Danes, the north experienced 
occasional uprisings. To the south, Otto I saw the opportunity to expand to Italy when King 
Berengar II attempted to take control of the Papal States. 5  
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The combined force of these conflicts from all sides was complicated further with the 
rebellions of various duchies within the kingdom against every ruler in the tenth century. By Otto 
I’s reign, ecclesiastical estates provided the bulk of military and economic support, and the 
infrastructure created by religious institutions on the border as well as the interior took part in 
every major conflict of the century, as did a number of bishops and abbots who fought both for 
the Saxons and against them.6 The king himself often took part of the wars and campaigns that 
posed a direct threat to his authority, or were designed to expand his territory. The areas 
neglected by the royal household were the areas that these warrior bishops were heavily involved 
in. Although the sheer number of ecclesiastical men increased dramatically in all areas over the 
course of the tenth century and into the eleventh century, they were the most prevalent in 
conflicts that the king did not have as much control over.7 The tenth century was the period in 
which the fighting clergy developed into a tool that the Ottonian Empire used to stabilize itself 
over a large geographical area.8 
 
The West: Clashes with West Francia and the Civil Wars 
Despite East Francia’s break in dynastic succession after the death of Louis the Child in 
911, the Saxon kings remained closely tied to Carolingian affairs. In 923, Henry managed to take 
control of Lotharingia, the middle kingdom, when he marched against the West Francian king 
Charles the Simple.9 This began a series of conflicts that in the West, which involved the middle 
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kingdom changing allegiance frequently between the rulers in the east and the west. Count 
Gislebert of Lotharingia was originally loyal to Henry I when the duchy was originally annexed 
by the east, but his first rebellion in 925 foreshadowed a series of conflicts spanning the reigns of 
Henry I and his son Otto.10 After Otto I’s coronation in 936, Gislebert and Duke Eberhard of 
Bavaria took advantage of the renewed wars in the west to side with Louis IV, Charles’s son, in 
favor of taking Lotharingia back from the Saxons.11 In the case of the 925 and 939 rebellions, as 
well as a rebellion instigated by Otto’s son Liudolf in 953, the king in question was physically 
present when his troops put down the rebellions.12 The last two rebellions in particular involved 
multiple conspirators in areas like Bavaria and Franconia—their dissent was a palpable threat to 
the king’s authority.  
According to Auer, Otto I’s policies towards Lotharingia became the turning point in the 
role of the fighting clergy. In 939, Duke Gislebert was not the only Lotharingian to turn against 
East Francia; the Bishops Bernain of Verdun , Gauzlin of Toul, and Adalbero of Metz all fought 
for Louis IV.13 Otto eventually subdued Louis IV and defeated the rebels in the Battle of 
Andernach, where Gislebert drowned while trying to flee across a river.14 Despite his victories, 
Adalbero actually managed to hold out in Metz for a while longer until there was news of the 
defeat and the German troops lifted their siege of the city. The high number of ecclesiastical 
military leaders was remarkable, and Otto clearly understood the importance of the episcopal 
cities as military strongholds. In the next significant conflict in Lotharingia under Otto II, the 
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young emperor focused on reinforcing the military strength of Toul and several monasteries in 
Lower Lotharingia. The goal was to pit them against the secular nobility in the Vogses 
Mountains; this did not succeed.15 Otto II”s appointment of the Lotharingian clergy, however, 
was by this point a fairly normal occurrence. His father gained interest in the military 
possibilities of the clergy, which was best exemplified by the appointment of Brun as the 
Archbishop of Cologne. 
 Brun of Cologne epitomized the aim of the Reichskirchensystem as both the Archbishop 
of Cologne and as the Duke of Lotharingia. He was Otto’s brother, the third son of Henry I and 
his second wife Mathilda. During the events of the 953 uprising, Otto named him the Archbishop 
of Cologne in order to counteract Duke Gislebert’s power in the west; when he died a year later, 
Brun received his title as well.16 He performed the duties of both titles from 954 until his death in 
965. The archbishop was undoubtedly the highest-profile warrior bishop of the tenth century; he 
was the secular and religious head of the entirety of Lotharingia and managed to bring it to heel 
while Otto I fought Hungarians and Slavs in the east and invaded Rome several years later.17 His 
presence in the west was a big factor in the success of Otto’s reign. Even when the king was not 
currently fighting a war, he could not impose his own authority in either upper or lower 
Lotharingia nearly as well as his brother could through his own political and military power. By 
installing Brun in the west, Otto managed to drastically extend his power through the Church 
into an area that needed constant attention. No one else received this much power after his death, 
but Bishop Notker of Liège became a close confidant of the Ottonian family and continued to 
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support their rule in Lotharingia.18 Although it is unclear whether he actually participated in a 
battle or led an army, he clearly held maintained his own militia and defended the Saxon rule 
with enthusiasm. His death in 1008 was a great loss for the German empire, especially 
considering that Henry II would be stuck fighting a war in Lotharingia himself while another war 
also raged in the east a couple years afterwards.19  
 The result of mounting reliance on the clergy in Lotharingia was evident in Henry II’s 
reign, when the bishops were at the height of their power within the imperial system. Many of 
the conflicts in the west were land disputes between the secular nobility and the ecclesiastical 
leaders in Lotharingia and its surrounding areas, which included conflicts with Frisia and 
Flanders. In the following decade, a dispute in 1018 between Count Dietrich III of Frisia and 
Bishop Adalbold of Utrecht ended in an ill-fated battle that consisted of the ecclesiastical 
contingents of Lower Lotharingia: Utrecht, Cambrai, Liège, and Trier.20 Adalbold and Count 
Gottfried of Verdun led the initial battle, which ended in failure. 
The latter had previously murdered the bishop’s retainers, thereby causing him much harm. Their 
warriors gathered on a certain island and quickly prepared for battle. But alas, the death with 
which they had threatened the enemy came to them instead. For they were attacked on all sides by 
the Frisians, who rushed out of their places of concealment. Without warning, the young man’s 
retainers were surrounded and, terrible to say, they lost their lives by the sword or in the water. 
They were unable to cause any harm to their opponents. The bishop escaped in a boat, and the 
duke was also rescued from the enemy. According to reliable testimony, the number of the dead 
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exceeded three legions. Now, the entire region lacks a strong defender and, in its misery, must fear 
the daily arrival of pirates.21 
Henry, who was in Nijmegen at the time, eventually interfered himself, although the bishop and 
the count eventually decided to reconcile in order to prepare against Viking attacks. Thietmar 
impressed that the region needed a strong defender to fulfill this task, and although the secular 
nobility were a part of this, the bishop of Utrecht was needed to consider the western coast safe 
from invasion.22 It is also notable that Dietrich was in fact one of Adalbold’s retainers; the count 
should have answered to the bishop directly rather than being on opposite sides of a war.23  
 As the territory controlled by the Ottonians grew, so did a number of uprisings that grew 
increasingly more elaborate with time. In each instance, the clergy became more integral to the 
response to these challenges to authority. The previously mentioned rebellion in 953 also 
involved the duchies of Bavaria and Franconia in addition to Lotharingia, which led to a siege of 
Regensburg.24 Among Otto’s supporters was Bishop Ulrich of Augsburg, who managed to defeat 
Liudolf’s troops in Swabia and seriously cripple the rebels’ support.25 In the following months 
the city surrendered, but the situation quickly spiraled out of control when Otto received word of 
Slavic invaders attacking Saxony under the leadership of two rebel counts, and Hungarian raiders 
attacked Bavaria shortly afterwards. In two decisive battles in 955, he crushed both invading 
armies. Ulrich played a large role in the Battle of Lechfeld, as the Hungarians had targeted the 
city of Augsburg.26 Although previous scholarship has attributed Otto’s victory his almost 
exclusive reliance on heavy cavalry, recent studies have concluded that the German army 
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defeated the Hungarians by utilizing the intricate system of fortifications on the eastern frontier. 
These fortresses served as bases for field operations, allowing them to plan short attacks that 
decimated the enemy and then retreat to well-protected fortifications.27 This strategy was called 
“defense in depth,” another term for the three-part military organization discussed in chapter 
one.28 Like most of the wars fought after Henry I, the focus was on fortifications. True to the 
pattern that started to appear, Ulrich was responsible for defending the fortified city rather than 
fighting in open battle. Very rarely were any of these men depicted on a battlefield (although it 
was not unheard of). The abundance of fortifications and sieges most likely contributed to the 
increase of the participation of the clergy in warfare; even if a bishop or abbot adhered to the 
bans laid down by the Church synods, leading the defense of a fortification would likely exempt 
him from having to wield a weapon or meet an enemy in open battle.29 
The East: Bordering the Barbarians 
 Ulrich was the only notable religious figure involved in the east under Henry I and Otto I, 
notwithstanding Archbishop Frederick of Mainz, who conspired with Liudolf and his allies but 
never actually fought.30 This was partially because there was no strong tradition of a bishopric or 
monasteries in the area; Magdeburg only became a diocese in 968.31 Strong military leadership 
on the eastern border usually fell to secular authorities, such as Margrave Gero, who defended 
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against Hungarians and Slavs until well into the 960s.32 The distinct lack of ecclesiastical 
involvement was simply because there was no infrastructure to support an ecclesiastical 
household. While the Saxons had been a nuisance in the east in previous centuries, the 
Hungarians and the Slavs became the new heathen enemies in the east, never seen before 
Ottonian period to this extent. This was new territory for the Church, and the Ottonians took full 
advantage of it by founding their most important monasteries and dioceses. Auer interpreted the 
development of the eastern Reichskirchensystem and the attached development of the fighting 
clergy as an inspiration or replica of the system that already existed in west, particularly because 
the foundation of the Diocese of Magdeburg occurred after the Lotharingian uprising.33 
However, the structure of the Reichskirchensystem was largely in place by the time this 
happened—Henry I himself founded Quedlinburg, and built many more fortifications that would 
become a part of this, including a castle in Meissen.34 Even if the local religious community was 
not a part of the defense in the first half of the tenth century, there was not much need for strong 
ecclesiastical leadership. Much of the eastern border was near the heart of Saxon territory, which 
meant that the secular and ecclesiastical leaders in the area were much more reliable than the 
nobility outside duchies such as Lotharingia and Bavaria. The system of Saxon monasteries and 
convents founded and maintained by the Ottonians also ensured that the royal family had a 
strong presence in the east, which meant that they did not have as much of a need for remote 
leadership. The strongest evidence of the fighting clergy on the eastern border was in Bavaria, 
which was much less controlled within the border as it was without, as the crisis in 953 revealed.  
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 The Slavs and the Hungarians, however, remained a problem that would earn the 
attention of the royal government and the Church for years to come. Henry I arranged a short 
peace with the Hungarians in 924, during which he built up his fortifications in the east and 
trained agrarii milites, or local militia, to man them.35 In 929, he launched a campaign against 
the Slavs and managed to subdue a number of different tribes, which was successful because he 
had access to local men and supplies.36 The later incorporation of ecclesiastical households in 
local levies and the Burgbann was clearly influenced by secular strategy of Henry’s campaigns. 
Once established, the clergy did follow the institutionalized obligations, and occasionally men 
like Ulrich of Augsburg made an appearance. A greater number of bishops began to appear on 
the eastern frontier towards the end of Otto I’s reign. Perhaps most infamously was Bishop 
Michael of Regensburg, who was the subject of an unusually colorful account:  
When the bishop had ruled the see long and well, he and other Bavarian leaders went to rescue the 
eastern regions where the Hungarians were again causing trouble. But the battle between them had 
barely begun when, alas, our forces were beaten and utterly demolished by the enemy. The bishop 
lost an ear, was also wounded in his other limbs, and lay among the fallen as if he were dead. 
Lying next to him was an enemy warrior. When he realized that the bishop alone was alive, and 
feeling safe from the snare of the enemy, he took a lance and tried to kill him. Strengthened by the 
Lord, the bishop emerged from the long, difficult struggle and killed his enemy.37 
The unusually detailed anecdote brings several things to light. The foremost was that there were 
men of the Church who fully participated in violent conflict, despite attempts by monastic 
authors to remove such evidence. Although Thietmar did not say that Michael actually carried a 
weapon, he did end up on a battlefield with a missing ear and several wounds. This likely meant 
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that he was actually in the battle rather than just commanding. Thietmar described him as one of 
the Bavarian leaders, which put him on equal ground with the local secular leaders. As an 
ecclesiastical leader with no secular titles, his military obligations lay completely within his 
status as the Bishop of Regensburg. He also actively killed a man, which would have counted as 
shedding blood, even if the action was in self-defense. Even so, Thietmar portrayed him as a 
hero of both laymen and clergy members alike. He was “held to be a brave warrior by all the 
clergy and the best of pastors by the people, and his mutilation brought him no shame.”38 
 The rich detail of Michael’s actions in battle was unusual, but excusable in the context of 
the battle he participated in. The man he fought was a pagan soldier in the Hungarian army, the 
one exception to the otherwise severe restrictions the Church put on participation in warfare, 
even if those restrictions were ignored regardless. The bishop had only killed in the defense of 
his own life and the lives of his fellow Christians, and was therefore justified in his actions. This 
mentality carried over from the barrage of Viking attacks in the north in the ninth century, when 
bishops were frequently forced to defend their own cities.39 Certainly, the war against Hungarian 
invaders and Slavic tribes would follow this rule. Thietmar described a campaign during Otto 
II’s reign against a Slavic uprising that Bishops Giselher of Merseburg and Hildeward of 
Halberstadt and were a part of, using precise religious terms to identify the campaign’s moral 
purpose: 
Bishops Giselher and Hildeward joined with Margrave Dietrich and with the other count . . . at 
dawn, on Saturday, they heard mass together. Then after fortifying body and spirit with the 
sacrament of heaven, they confidently fell onto the approaching enemy and, except for a few who 
found refuge on a hill, completely annihilated them. The victors praised God, marvelous in all his 
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works, and the truthful word of the teacher, Paul, was confirmed: ‘There is neither prudence nor 
strength nor counsel against the Lord.’40  
The clear religious boundary between the bishops and their aristocratic allies and the Slavic 
enemy made their participation in ‘complete annihilation’ justifiable. Thietmar makes note of the 
liturgical rites performed by the Germans before battle, a clear sign that their victory was 
divinely willed.41 While Thietmar does not reveal the extent to which the two bishops took part 
in military command, he does not set them apart from the secular leaders who must have 
participated in the bloodshed.  
 The eastern conflicts under Otto I’s successors, however, did not always involve non-
Christian opponents. Under Otto II, the Archbishop Giselher of Magdeburg gained the rights to 
an army, and protected the eastern border with the support of several counts and Margrave 
Dietrich von der Nordmark. 42 During the early years of Otto III’s reign when his mother, the 
Empress Theophanu was regent, Miesco of a newly Christianized Poland under Duke Miesco 
entered into a war with Boleslav II of Bohemia, calling upon the Saxon empire to aid him. 
Theophanu sent Giselher to aid him.43 As both sides were led by Christian leaders, the conflicts 
of the east held the same moral ambiguity as the conflicts in west and the south, particularly 
when Henry II decided to switch sides in the prolonged conflict and start a war against Poland.44 
But the eastern frontier needed a stronger system with local leaders at this point in time. Otto II 
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had left for Italy in 980 and never returned; Otto III was only three years old and Empress 
Theophanu nearly lost him to the plots of Henry II of Bavaria, who attempted to use his young 
cousin to claim the throne for himself.45 The earlier Saxon kings may have been able to control 
monitor the frontier earlier, but the near-crisis in the 980s meant that the east had a power 
vacuum to fill. The fighting clergy in the east after Otto I were necessary to the stability of the 
region, and so Giselher was present in the histories alongside war heroes like Michael of 
Regensburg. 
The South: Italy and the Papacy 
The amount of secular influence over the local clergy also indicated the general 
ineffectualness of the papacy and their attempt to create a central ecclesiastical power. Although 
reformers in the eleventh century attacked the stranglehold the German kings had over the 
clergy, using the Pope as a counterpoint to Salian Emperor Henry IV, criticism of the military 
affairs of men such as Michael of Regensburg during the tenth century and early eleventh 
century was minimal.46 The increasing acceptance towards warfare and violence was only part of 
it—there was no counterpoint to the empire save for the Pope, whose influence was largely 
unimportant in Germany during the tenth century.  The imperial crown was an important symbol 
for both the Carolingians and the Ottonians, but the power it bestowed was arguably already 
present in the royal church system that often answered to the king regardless of titles. When the 
clergy had to provide military support in order to govern themselves, local authority was more 
important than a man in Rome. Some clerical authors took care, however, to note that the current 
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king was also the Emperor, and that they owed their allegiance to him as a ruler of divine right.47 
This view persisted for some areas of Europe even through the Investiture Controversy, when the 
Papacy finally regained some power. 
The Ottonians initially had little direct contact with the papacy, and only got involved 
with papal affairs when they campaigned in Rome. The first campaign in Italy was under Otto I 
in 951 when he answered a distress call from Adelaide of Italy, who offered to marry Otto in 
exchange for protection from Berengar II of Italy. The campaign was fairly short; Otto became 
the overlord of Northern Italy with little opposition and didn’t involve papal conflicts. In the 
950s, however, Berengar took advantage of the chaos in Germany and attacked the Papal States. 
John XII appealed to Otto to intervene, and the king prepared a second campaign into Italy.48 
Auer pointed out that while Otto did well on this first campaign, he had relatively few Italian 
bishops to rely on, whereas Berengar had the staunch support of several key bishops.49 In order 
to invade Italy and occupy it successfully for a long period of time, Otto would have to gain the 
support of the local clergy to create his own support system in the territory. This showed that he 
was aware of the importance the military support the clergy provided to him; much of his support 
also came from the Reichskirchensystem from home.50 By taking advantage of the military and 
economic services provided by the German and the Italian high clergy, Otto I was able to 
successfully invade Rome and overthrow Berengar. In 962 the pope crowned him the Emperor of 
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the Holy Roman Empire, which paralleled Charlemagne’s entrance in Rome two hundred years 
prior.51  
The title of Emperor was largely ceremonial, considering that the German king made it to 
Rome by using the clergy to his advantage. The title further justified the institutionalization of 
the fighting clergy in literature as Otto I, Otto II, Otto III and Henry II exercised divine right 
through their status, which gave their hold over the clergy more legitimacy. The authority it 
endowed in Germany, however, did not work as well in Italy. The Italian nobility revolted 
several times over the course of the tenth century against the empire’s influence, prompting each 
new German king to launch a new campaign to Rome. In each of these campaigns, Auer counted 
an increasing number of bishops that accompanied the king to Rome. Otto I returned a third time 
to Italy in 965 to put down yet another rebellion that had deposed the newly-elected pope 
representing the emperor’s interests.52 He frequently traveled to Italy between 965 and 970, 
dealing with the Italian nobility as well as the Byzantine Empire. During that time, he brought at 
least twenty eight bishops and their military contingents with him. This was a far cry from his 
earlier campaigns that were mainly secular.53 When Otto II campaigned in Italy, three fourths of 
his army comprised of ecclesiastical households.54 When Otto III launched his final campaign in 
1001, the bishops that accompanied him represented nearly every diocese in his empire with the 
exception a few that had little military significance. Not all of these men served the emperor in a 
military capacity, but the Italian campaigns clearly displayed, in quantitative numbers, the 
Ottonians’ increasing utilization of the clergy as a display of military, political, and ecclesiastical 
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power.55 Bishops both from the emperor’s homeland served in his campaign, while gaining the 
support of the local Italian clergy was paramount to holding Italy for a longer period of time.  
The sheer number of the bishops in the Emperor’s military retinue did not discourage 
uprisings or dissent in Italy. While each king installed a pope who was sympathetic to their needs 
when necessary, the Roman nobility overthrew undesirable candidates and placed their own 
candidates on the papal throne at an alarming rate. Otto I and his successors had the foresight to 
commend several of their own men to the Roman episcopates, such as Otto III’s cousin Gregory 
V, who became the pope during his first campaign in 996, but the peace did not last.56 The 
Ottonians had a weak hold on Italy while they were away, and unlike their unfrequented areas 
near their homeland that were supported by the royal churches, the German influence was too 
weak in Rome. Even though Otto III attempted to stay in Rome during the end of his reign—he 
actually planned to rule from Rome and had begun an ecclesiastical reform program there—his 
death in 1002 once again loosened the empire’s grip on Italy.57 In order to keep Italy under his 
control, the Henry II had to travel there personally and exert his authority. 
Conclusion 
 The fighting clergy were visible in every corner of the empire, supporting the king in his 
military campaigns and defending the regions when he wasn’t present. The quantity of 
ecclesiastical magnates performing military duty increased significantly after the first half of the 
century, at the end of Otto I’s reign, but the foundations of their effectiveness as military 
commanders were in place long before that. The Church’s military duties through the Burgbann 
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and the Ottonians’ itinerant rule made ecclesiastical households a logical choice to defend the 
realm during an intensified use of siege warfare. The king’s increasing reliance on the clergy for 
military support was not always successful—Adalbold of Utrecht’s blunder, for example, 
harmed the empire’s activities in the west more than anything. But the systemized use of the 
fighting clergy normalized the presence of the bishop in military command, so much that they 
were expected to fight for the empire by the end of the tenth century. 
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Chapter 3: The Memory of the Fighting Clergy in the Ottonian Period 
In earlier centuries, the concept of the fighting clergy was novel and contested by secular 
and religious authorities; by the eleventh century, the military capacity of the clergy had reached 
its full potential. Henry regularly deployed members of the high clergy and utilized ecclesiastical 
military resources for both offensive and defensive confrontations at a higher rate than the 
secular nobility.1 This reliance on the Church for military support began in the eighth and ninth 
centuries, but it evolved drastically in East Francia over the course of the tenth century. Along 
with the actual development of the fighting clergy came a fundamental change in the attitude of 
the clergy themselves towards their role in warfare, evident in the contemporary sources that 
reflected on the military affairs of the Ottonian Empire. As previously discussed, these sources 
were not entirely reliable and must always be read in context, they provide valuable clues as to 
how the clergy viewed the legitimacy and the significance of the fighting clergy. Criticism and 
controversy among tenth century authors existed, certainly; the close relationship between the 
secular and the ecclesiastical offices in the Holy Roman Empire experienced a violent backlash 
fin the mid-eleventh century when the Pope finally began to step out of the shadow of the Holy 
Roman Emperor. At the height of the Ottonian Empire, however, criticism was mild, and in 
some cases, it was not even directed towards the violence itself, but rather the political 
implications of the event in question. Authors discussed the bishops and abbots involved in 
warfare with a matter-of-fact tone and occasionally with admiration. These men were not 
violating the law or committing atrocities unbefitting of their stature, but rather acting as loyal 
vassals of the Empire and defending their flocks against invaders. By examining the nature of the 
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sources themselves, we see a clear relationship between the treatment of the fighting clergy and 
their mounting significance in the military and political affairs of the empire. 
It is no coincidence that the most prominent accounts of the tenth-century Ottonian 
Empire were written by men with strong Saxon ties. Widukind of Corvey and Thietmar of 
Merseburg provided the most reliable histories that displayed intimate knowledge of military 
matters. Written nearly fifty years apart, their accounts revealed a changing attitude in Saxon 
circles, particularly, towards the fighting clergy and towards warfare as a whole. Widukind 
discussed the accomplishments of Henry I and Otto I, who revived the Carolingian tradition of 
using the Church for political and military infrastructure. Thietmar borrowed heavily from 
Widukind to discuss the earlier events of the tenth century, but his in-depth accounts of the 
reigns of Otto II, Otto III, and Henry II revealed how prevalent the fighting clergy was due to the 
foundations laid by their predecessors. The geographical shift of power from to the west to the 
east was a major factor in the development of the fighting clergy; it also affected the attitudes 
towards the system and its place in society. Widukind and Thietmar were both located in Saxony 
itself, far enough east to be in the center of royal influence. Both Merseburg and the monastery 
of Corvey were wonderful examples of the royal churches in the network of Ottonian power 
centers. Corvey’s central location connected the western duchies to the East, serving as an 
important royal monastery on the road to Lotharingia, especially.2 The See of Merseburg was 
one of the easternmost ecclesiastical establishments in Saxony itself, and served as an important 
base for missionary work for the Slavic peoples in the east.3 
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Authors in other geographical areas showed an increasing lenience towards the fighting 
clergy as well. While their support for the fighting clergy of the Ottonian Empire was decidedly 
less enthusiastic and more critical, authors in regions such as the west showed admiration for the 
bishops and abbots who led the defense of their cities. Widukind and Thietmar had a clear bias 
towards the legacy of the Ottonian emperors, but the progression of historical accounts 
throughout the empire indicated a wider acceptance of the marriage of martial and religious 
power. These accounts showed how the Ottonian emperors anchored their ecclesiastical authority 
in the east, where the Saxon nobility had the strongest hold, and imposed their values on the rest 
of the Church system through the infrastructure of the empire itself.  
Widukind of Corvey 
Widukind made a point to legitimize the Saxon kings’ rule by connecting them to the 
earlier Carolingian Empire, although he emphasized the dynasty’s identity as Saxons was 
paramount, especially in regards to Otto I. This decision was doubtlessly made regarding his 
audience, Otto’s own family. The first book described the origin of the Saxons as a kind of 
heroic age, culminating in Charlemagne’s subjugation and conversion of the Saxon people in the 
early ninth century, which “ as we see today, it was as if [the Franks and the Saxons] had been 
transformed into  one people through their Christian faith.”4 After the conversion took place, 
Widukind also referred to the Saxons as East Franks, and the “entire Frankish and Saxon people” 
witnessed the both Henry I and Otto I ascend to the throne.5 While Henry was portrayed as an 
equal among Saxons and Franks alike, Otto I had a stronger connection to his identity as a Saxon 
                                                          
4 Widukind of Corvey, Deeds of the Saxons, trans. David S. Bachrach and Bernard S. Bachrach (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 26. 
5 Ibid., 39 and 61. 
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leader. At his coronation, the king wore a “tight tunic in the Frankish style.”6 In a description of 
his manner and personality, however, Widukind claimed that “he dress[ed] in the clothing of his 
homeland, and never puts on foreign garb.”7 While Widukind worked to portray the Ottonians as 
continuators of the Carolingian tradition, he also showed a slow acceptance of the incorporation 
of a Saxon identity, as well. The extent of Otto I’s ‘Saxon-ness’ was highlighted in obvious 
ways, such as the description of his clothing, it could also be found in Widukind’s approach to 
interpreting history itself. The most prominent way in which this was displayed was the 
information that he chose to include or to leave out altogether.  
Deeds of the Saxons focused on the military exploits of the Henry I and Otto I in 
locations close to their homeland, particularly in the wars to the east. Liudolf’s rebellion and the 
subsequent siege of Regensburg, the Battle of Lechfeld, and Otto’s campaign against the Slavs 
were all described in great detail, which defined the tone of the entire history. Other exploits, 
such as his 962 campaign into Italy, were all but ignored, merely a footnote in the grand history 
of the Saxon kings.8 Widukind detailed Otto’s second war against Berengar II, but left no 
mention of his meeting with the pope. Although he called him the “elect of God,” which referred 
to his royal unction as a king, no mention of the pope could be found. Yet Widukind did not 
neglect to speak of him as if he were an emperor after the fact. His power in Saxony and the 
surrounding kingdoms was enough for Widukind—clearly, the authority of the pope held little 
meaning for him and possibly not for his royal audience. It would be impossible to interpret his 
                                                          
6 Ibid., 63. 
7 Ibid., 94.  
8 Widukind first refers to Otto I as “the emperor” after the Battle of Lechfeld, before he actually received the title, 
possibly because of the king’s change in status, or because he considered the victory over the Hungarians to be the 
actions of an emperor; in this case, he would be drawing similarities between Otto I and Charlemagne. Widukind, 
Deeds, 129. 
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motivations behind leaving out Otto’s coronation as emperor, but Widukind didn’t seem put 
much stock in the religious politics outside of his local area.  
Widukind did, however, praise Brun of Cologne for his role in bringing peace to 
Lotharingia as both a bishop and a duke. Widukind did not discuss the controversy of the royal 
churches under the Saxon kings and their disregard for the cannon, but he handled Brun’s blatant 
contradiction of Church doctrine with a simple statement: “Let no one say that Brun bears some 
guilt for this, since we read that Samuel, the saint, and many others were both priests and 
judges.”9 His explanation did not illustrate a reason for which this merger of secular and 
ecclesiastical offices was acceptable, but it did indicate that the possibility was not as taboo as it 
would have been during the Carolingian period, likely because he was surrounded by clergymen 
who blurred the lines between the secular and ecclesiastical as well. He did not expand upon 
Brun’s military exploits in Lotharingia, similarly to his omission of Otto’s coronation, but he 
recorded the outcome of the bishop’s efforts, which was to stabilize the region. His interpretation 
mirrored that of Ruotger, a monk who wrote the archbishop’s biography, Life of Bruno, after his 
death in the 960s. Ruotger responded to the criticism of Brun’s dual positions in Lotharingia and 
his military exploits with the same response: his actions brought peace to the turbulent region, so 
the ends justified the means.10  
Both authors clearly sided with the Ottonians—and Brun, despite his prominence as a 
member of the clergy, was still an immediate member of the royal family—which caused them to 
disregard the various dilemmas the region experienced even after Brun got it under control. He 
had trouble placing his own candidates in strategic positions, such as the abbey of Lobbes, near 
                                                          
9 Widukind, Deeds, 44.  
10 Henry Mayr-Harting, Church and Cosmos in Ottonian Germany: The View from Cologne (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 6. 
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the see of Liège. The monks rejected Brun’s candidate, a Lotharingian noble named Folciun, due 
to his connections to the Ottonians. He eventually gained a foothold in the abbey with the help of 
Bishop Notker, but the political opposition of the Lobbes monks reflected a general resistance to 
the intrusion of pro-Ottonian clergymen the Archbishop attempted to install.11 Clergymen from 
western regions seemed to be more inclined towards criticism of Brun’s political and military 
dominance. Flodoard of Reims was another writer of the tenth century who rarely addressed 
Brun as an archbishop at all, which Henry Mayr-Harting suggests may have been a subtle way of 
criticizing his military actions as while holding a title that should have prohibited him from 
doing so.12 The dissent towards Brun from both ecclesiastical and secular leaders in Lotharingia 
was palpable in other texts, but not in Deeds of the Saxons. Widukind finished the book around 
the same time Ruotger wrote his biography; if he had access to it, perhaps he deemed the other 
monk’s defense to be sufficient. It is more likely, however, that his project focused on the eastern 
portion of the empire and did not regard the dissent against Brun’s during his twelve-year reign 
as important. 
Altogether, Widukind’s view of the Ottonian Empire was localized, focusing on the 
duchies of the German kingdom and ignoring some of the events that happened on the fringe of 
Saxony. Corvey’s location had ties to the old Carolingian kingdom and was physically much 
closer to the western portions of the realm than the newly established monasteries and dioceses 
on the eastern frontier, but it was still intimately connected to the Ottonian royal family through 
its status as a royal monastery. Otto I possibly visited Corvey nearly likely times during his 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 29. 
12 Ibid., 26. 
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reign.13 Widukind would have been aware of the role of the clergy in warfare due to his close 
proximity to the imperial family, as well as Corvey’s own involvements with military 
obligations—contingents from Corvey were present in the 946 campaign in Lotharingia, though 
their numbers were not known.14 Although Widukind did not mention clergymen other than Brun 
in a military context, his ambivalence towards the subject suggested that in the mid-tenth 
century, the clergy of Saxony were at least not completely adverse to this development. 
Thietmar of Merseburg 
If Widukind focused primarily on Saxony, Thietmar was broader in scope; he took into 
account a wider range of lands and events that were important to the development of the fighting 
clergy. While he drew strongly from Deeds of the Saxons for the earlier events of his Chronicon, 
he also added and omitted details as he saw fit. The Ottonian Empire had expanded since 
Widukind’s contribution, and the Otto I’s descendants spent more and more time in Rome 
towards the end of the tenth century. Thietmar put a greater emphasis on Otto I’s Italian 
campaigns and his relationship with the Pope, which added to his and his heir’s legitimacy in 
their rule as well as their rule over the clergy. As the emperor of what could now be called the 
Holy Roman Empire, Otto’s sacral authority in nearly all matters was uncontested; his 
appointments to various positions in the clergy made with “papal authority,” which emphasized 
the fact that he had the spiritual authority to do so.15 Interestingly, Thietmar was quite sensitive 
to the Ottonians’ growing power over the internal affairs of the clergy, particularly concerning 
events closer to his own time. Before he officially became the bishop of the newly-reinstated 
                                                          
13 Bernhardt, Itinerant Kingship, 196. Only one known visit was officially recorded, but Bernhardt speculates that 
Otto I visited up to 28 times based on itinerary models. 
14 Auer, “Kriegsdienst,” 343.  
15 Thietmar of Merseburg, Ottonian Germany: The Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg, trans. David A. Warner 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 108. 
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diocese of Merseburg, his candidacy was jeopardized when Henry II attempted to install 
someone else as bishop. Thietmar’s mentor, Tagino of Magdeburg, managed to convince the 
king to give Merseburg to Thietmar, but the threat of secular interference was an issue for the 
bishop.16 This concern for the power of lay investiture, even as he promoted the emperor’s divine 
right over the clergy within the empire, may have indicated the beginnings of the Investiture 
Controversy that would erupt over this very issue several decades later. On the other hand, he did 
not express concern for the clergy’s obligations to participate in secular politics—or in war. 
Indeed, much of his writing strived to legitimize the role of the fighting clergy. Thietmar singled 
out a larger number of warrior bishops in his work, going to great lengths to protect their 
reputation.  
Thietmar’s fascination with the military affairs of the tenth century stemmed from his 
own experiences. Like Widukind, he came from an aristocratic family in Saxony, and many of 
his relatives actually participated in the wars that he wrote about.17 Thietmar himself was a close 
confidant of Henry II and his wife, Cunigunde, as the king invested a good amount of time and 
political power into Merseburg after it was reestablished as a bishopric.18 While the shedding of 
blood was still frowned upon, the concept of the warrior bishop was fascinating rather than 
shameful. Thietmar’s account of Arn of Würzburg followed this pattern:  
While returning from an expedition against the Bohemians, Bishop Arn of Würzburg set up his 
tent near this river, in the region of Schkeuditz, on a hill by the road leading to the north. As he 
chanted the mass, he was surrounded by a hostile army. After all of his companions had been 
                                                          
16 Ibid., 264. 
17 Ibid., 162. His father was Count Sigfried of Walbeck, who died in 991. 
18 David S. Bachrach, “The Military Organization of Ottonian Germany, c. 900-1018: The Views of Bishop Thietmar 
of Merseburg,” The Journal of Military History 72 (2008), 1067. 
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martyred, he too was offered to God, along with the host which had been consecrated to the 
sacrifice of the praise.19   
Thietmar’s description of his death was hagiographic, depicting the bishop as a role model and a 
martyr, despite his presence on a military campaign. Clergymen travelled with armies to provide 
religious services to the military, but Arn was a known warrior.20 His name appeared in the 
Annals of Fulda in conflicts between the Slavs and the Bavarians multiple times, and he 
defended against Vikings as well.21 Even though he was honored in the Chronicon for his non-
violent death, Thietmar did not apologize for or defend his militant past. Arn died just before the 
turn of the century in 892, before the focus of this paper.22 Thietmar, however, recorded his death 
during the reign of Henry II, looking back on the golden age of Ottonian kings and the conflicts 
that wracked the tenth century.  
 The bishops that he took interest in generally fought the battles and wars that were 
justified, often located on the eastern or the northern frontier. Michael of Regensburg and Arn of 
Würzburg certainly fit into this category. Thietmar witnessed firsthand some of the campaigns in 
the east, which dealt with barely civilized people. The clergy of the west and the south were 
harder to portray. Adalbold of Utrecht, for example, led his men and the men of other episcopal 
contingents into a bloody battle that meant little in the end, anyway.23 Thietmar refrained from 
praising Adalbold in this anecdote, instead constructing a careful apology for the bishop and 
focusing on the fact that with him and his secular rival incapacitated, the coast was vulnerable to 
                                                          
19 Thietmar, Chronicon, 69.  
20 Friedrich Prinz, Klerus und Krieg im Früheren Mittelalter: Untersuchungen zur Rolle der Kirche beim Aufbau der 
Königsherrschaft (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1971), 139. 
21 The Annals of Fulda mention Arn in 871, 872, and 884. In the former conflicts, he fought on the eastern frontier; 
in 884, his adversaries were Viking invaders. Timothy Reuter, trans., The Annals of Fulda: Ninth Century Histories, 
Volume II (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 66, 68 and 95.  
22 Thietmar, Chronicon, 69. 
23 See pp. 33. 
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Viking attacks.24 While he condemned the violence Adalbold was involved in, Thietmar also 
managed to make a point of his military significance in the area. 
 In a similar vein, he also criticized Archbishop Giselher of Magdeburg for his lack of 
military shrewdness and political ambitions, rather than his actual participation in warfare. His 
dislike for the archbishop likely stemmed from his role in the suppression of the See of 
Merseburg. According to Thietmar, Giselher, who was originally the bishop of Merseburg, was 
responsible for this act, which caused Thietmar “both disgust and embarrassment . . . and 
Giselher, not [Merseburg’s] pastor but rather a mercenary who strove ever upwards, attained his 
goal on 10 September . . .”25 His goal was the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, a more illustrious 
position on the eastern frontier of the empire. By dissolving Merseburg’s bishopric and 
dissolving his own title, he was free to take Magdeburg. Of course, Otto II also had a hand in 
dissolving the bishopric, but Thietmar fails to mention him, laying the blame solely on 
Giselher.26 If this was also a criticism of Ottonian emperor’s control over internal ecclesiastical 
affairs, it was a subtle rebuke. 
 Thietmar’s derisive label of mercenary was a strange choice, considering that he did not 
criticize the bishop for his role military matters. As shown in chapter two, Giselher was 
presented on equal footing with the secular nobles sent to secure the eastern frontier on behalf of 
the royal family.27 His derisive attitude returned in full force, however, when recalling a military 
blunder the archbishop made in 997: 
                                                          
24 Thietmar, Chronicon, 380. 
25 Ibid., 139. 
26 David A. Warner, introduction to Ottonian Germany: The Chronicon of Thietmar of Merseburg, by Thietmar of 
Merseburg, trans. David A. Warner (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 37. 
27 See pp. 38. 
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Let us recall to memory what wretched damage occurred to Archbishop Giselher because of his 
carelessness. For the protection of our homeland, the emperor had the Arneburg reinforced with 
necessary defensive works and placed it in Giselher’s custody for a period of four weeks . . . 
Through some yet unknown ruse, he was invited to a meeting with the Slavs and went out 
accompanied only by a small entourage. Some went ahead, while others remained in the fortress. 
Suddenly one of his companions announced that their enemies were bursting out of the woods. 
After milites from both sides were joined in combat, the archbishop, who had been travelling in a 
cart, fled on a fast horse. Only a few of his companions escaped death. Thus, the victorious Slavs 
plundered the belongings of the dead in complete security—it was 2 July—and complained only 
that the archbishop had escaped. In spite of the of the fact that his forces had been so severely cut 
up, Giselher guarded the fortress up to the agreed-upon day. While he was returning home, in 
great sadness, he encountered my paternal uncle, Margrave Liuthar, in whose care the 
aforementioned burg was now to reside. Without hesitation, he commended it to him and departed. 
When the margrave arrived, he saw smoke and fire coming from the fortress. A messenger was 
sent to request that the archbishop return, but without success and Liuthar himself tried to put out 
the fire, now raging in two different places. When nothing came of this, he surrendered the portal, 
opened it to the enemy, and sadly returned home. Afterwards, when complaints about hum were 
brought before the emperor, he purged himself of any guilt by swearing an oath.28 
The detailed description of the archbishop’s failure was likely reliable, if biased, 
considering Thietmar’s uncle took part in the event. His criticism is focused on Giselher’s initial 
blunder, leaving the fortress to be ambushed, and then his failure to aid Margrave Liuthar after 
his military household’s time manning the fortress had expired. Like his criticism of Adalbold of 
Utrecht, Thietmar’s intention was to critique the military decisions of the warrior bishop rather 
than to condemn him. Even though he shared his duties with a secular leader, Giselher’s 
                                                          
28 Thietmar, Chronicon, 178-179. 
56 
 
mistakes cost the margrave the fortress and weakened the eastern defenses. His anecdote 
highlighted the strategic significance of the bishop as an effective military commander.  
The Authors of Lotharingia 
In the west, writers took a more tentative approach to the portrayal of violence in the 
clergy and the legacy of the warrior bishop. J.R. Webb’s recent article “Representations of the 
warrior-bishop in eleventh-century Lotharingia” gives an excellent analysis of the changing 
attitudes towards the fighting clergy on the outskirts of the empire, where the political 
atmosphere was more removed from the Saxon government in the east. 29 The focus of his study 
took place in the latter half of the eleventh century, when the Salian dynasty lost control over the 
papacy and dissent of the emperor’s stranglehold on ecclesiastical affairs was more prominent 
than it was in Thietmar’s time. While the authors’ attitude towards the concept of the warrior 
bishop was remarkably similar to the Ottonian authors listed previously, they were more 
sensitive and accepting to the violence in which the fighting clergy likely participated in, even if 
they did not lose an ear or their life. 
Anselm’s accounts sources detailing the warrior bishops of Lotharingia shied further 
away from violence, but not from the legitimacy of the bishop in battle. He first wrote a 
biography of his predecessor, Wazo of Liège. While he never depicted Wazo participating in 
violence, the older bishop actively led defenses of the city on multiple occasions. In order to 
defend him from possible critics, Anselm drew from a tradition of warrior bishops in Liège, all 
of whom defended the city out of necessity. The first man, Saint Lambert, was no warrior at all 
but an aggressively peaceful bishop who refused to draw his sword against his enemies. While 
                                                          
29 J.R. Webb, “Representations of the warrior-bishop in eleventh-century Lotharingia,” Early Medieval  
Europe 24.1 (2016), 103-130. 
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the first versions of this tale depicted Lambert initially defending himself before laying down his 
arms, Anselm allowed for no such hesitation.30 The completely passive Lambert was a model for 
the bishops to follow; although they clearly participated in warfare, none of Anselm’s subjects 
ever directly participated in violence. Their contributions through military activity were 
significant; Bishop Franco defended the city against Viking attacks in the late ninth century, and 
Bishop Notker, a man loyal to the empire, organized military operations out of Lotharingia to 
maintain control in the west in the early eleventh century. Both of these men were dutiful to their 
lord and their people, and they did so, at least as far as Anselm was concerned, without 
bloodshed. 31  Wazo did the same through his military exploits. In fact, Anselm used their 
example to apologize for Wazo’s neglect of the emperor’s interests military affairs rather than 
his participation in warfare altogether. While he defended Liège and its surrounding lands, the 
bishop refused to leave his diocese to do anything further.32 His actions were highly offensive to 
the emperor, as he refused to fight any more than he had to in order to defend his own diocese.  
Another work out of Lotharingia, Vita Balderici, recounted the failed example of the 
warrior bishop. The author, a monk from Saint-Jacques writing around 1100, depicted the 
military conflicts and eventual defeat led by the monastery’s founder, Bishop Balderic II of 
Liège. Like Anselm’s account, Vita Balderici did not condone the violence of warfare and sought 
to justify Balderic’s actions through pure necessity. The bishop usually fought against rebellious 
nobility in the name of Henry II. Balderic’s attempt to build a castle near Louvain, home to a 
rebellious count, resulted in a battle between the secular and ecclesiastical forces in 1013; the 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 104-105. 
31 Ibid., 113-114. Franco, according to Anselm, actually resigned from his post after he spilled blood in battle, thus 
keeping his image as a cleric dedicated to non-violence. 
32 Ibid., 115. 
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count badly defeated.33 Balderic’s actions could have easily been excused as his duty to perform 
servitium regis, as he attempted to impose imperial rule on the region through his own episcopal 
forces, but this was not enough for the author to leave the matter alone. In order to rectify his 
mistakes, Balderic constructed the monastery of Saint-Jacques, driving home the fact that 
“leading an army in a worldly fashion was a great sin for a priest.”34 Whether or not this was 
truthfully the reason for the monastery’s foundations is debatable, but irrelevant. The author, 
writing fifty years after Anselm in the same city, was even more adamant against the 
participation of the clergy in violence; even his service on behalf of Henry II did not excuse his 
actions. This is almost a parallel image of Thietmar of Merseburg’s treatment of Adalbold of 
Utrecht’s defeat in the same year; the Ottonian bishop still recognized the military potential of 
the fighting clergy even in their failures. In the monastic tradition of the west, however, the 
monk of Saint-Jacques deemed this military participation as altogether unnecessary and even 
sinful. 
Conclusion 
The concept of the fighting clergy became significantly more positive in the tenth 
century, particularly in the heart of the Ottonian Empire, where the military service ecclesiastical 
magnates was imperative to the protection and stability of the empire. Widukind and Thietmar’s 
accounts showed a mounting tolerance for violence within the clergy, and while the later authors 
in Lotharingia refrained from depicting the violent image of the warrior bishop, they also 
understood the importance of the clergy’s involvement in warfare. This positive image showed 
                                                          
33 Ibid., 118. 
34 Ibid., 120. 
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how much events of the tenth century changed the role of the warrior bishop, an image that 
lasted into the eleventh century before the Investiture Controversy. 
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Conclusion 
It was during the tenth century that the Ottonians used the clergy’s military capacity at an 
increasing rate to exercise control over the empire, fundamentally changing the relationship 
between clergy and warfare. In earlier centuries, the Frankish kingdoms took control of local 
religious institutions and implemented a political agenda that married the Church and the State, 
forcing secular and military duties upon the high clergy. When the Ottonian kings implemented 
the Reichskirchensystem after consolidating the lands in East Francia, obligations to the state 
intensified. Because the kings used a network of royal ecclesiastical institutions to move between 
duchies and to impose their authority, the royal monasteries and their economic contributions, 
maintenance of roads and fortresses, and military households became crucial to the empire’s 
political and military structure. The heads of these households, bishops, abbots, and even 
abbesses, had additional duties that mirrored the secular nobility, which indicated the escalating 
blurring of the distinction between the religious and secular offices. 
Henry I’s reliance on siege warfare and the defense and upkeep of fortifications in the 
first half of the tenth century ensured that the clergy’s role in military operations was crucial 
throughout the empire. Ecclesiastical leaders could defend cities and fortresses from within, 
avoiding the Church’s ban of bloodshed, even if some figures would engage in battle anyway. 
While these spectacular stories of the warrior bishop occurred in every region of the empire, it 
was obvious that the majority of them were concentrated in the regions where the king’s direct 
authority was weaker. Under Otto I, this was in the western regions of the realm; in later dates, 
the presence of the clergy became stronger in the east. As the fighting clergy developed under 
the Ottonians, their appearances became more frequent, showing that it was in the tenth century 
that their military potential were realized. 
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The slow acceptance of violence in the Ottonian Empire is evident in the histories of 
Thietmar and Widukind, who treated the fighting clergy with veneration and respect. Their 
accounts of the tenth century emphasized the military exploits of the Saxon kings and their 
ecclesiastical retainers, asserting that their actions were for the defense of the kingdom. The 
change in attitude towards the fighting clergy in the tenth century indicated not only their 
acceptance in the tenth century, but also their significance; the military support provided by the 
Church was just as important as the secular nobility. Due to the system built around the king’s 
itinerant form of rule, the clergy were an inevitable part of the secular affairs of the empire, and 
the military responsibility they took on was inseparable from their role in the government of the 
Ottonian empire. It is for this reason that the warrior bishop should be examined within the 
context of the tenth century: the policies and strategies of the Ottonian kings developed the 
fighting clergy into an effective military bastion that defined the conflicts of the tenth century. 
Epilogue: Backlashes in the Eleventh Century 
The general acceptance of the warrior bishop, as an isolated phenomenon and as a 
symptom of the extensive Reichskirchenystem, began to disintegrate after the succession of the 
Salian dynasty in the eleventh century. Henry III deposed no less than three rival popes and 
replaced his own German candidate on the papal seat in 1045, and managed to keep a German 
pope on the throne until his death in 1056.1 The Italian nobility was able to reclaim the papacy 
from his six-year-old son, Henry IV, and the deceased king’s previous interference with the 
papal elections became the source of the Investiture Controversy. This marked an important 
                                                          
1 T.J.H. McCarthy, trans., Chronicles of the Investiture Contest: Frutolf of Michelsburg and his Continuators 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 2-3. 
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backlash against secular attempts to appoint ecclesiastical positions.2 This issue, which was a 
point of contention in the Carolingian period, still caused friction in the tenth century, although 
the German king’s right to appoint bishops and abbots was rarely contested.  Local clergy often 
expressed imperial loyalty to the point of disregarding doctrines of the Church, as seen with 
Thietmar and Widukind, but this devotion began to wane during the Henry IV’s reign. Herman 
of Reichenau, the first author of The Swabian Chronicles, initially supported the German 
imperial agenda, but his enthusiasm waned and he started to support papal reform.3 This 
resistance to imperial control over the church was not directly aimed at the presence of the clergy 
in military affairs, but rather the system in which they operated.   
There was also resistance against violence in the clergy; it was Henry III himself who 
attempted to introduce the Peace of God movement.4 This movement promoted nonviolence, 
particularly in regards to the Church, and was popular in the eleventh century.5 It was founded in 
the tenth century, a possible response to the increasing militarization of the clergy under the 
Ottonians and the constant violence the laity were surrounded by.6 Its impact, however, was not 
felt in Germany until the succeeding century. While resistance always existed, the silence of the 
tenth century and early eleventh century indicated that the fighting clergy had reached its 
Blütezeit. 
 
                                                          
2 Ibid., 5-6. 
3 I.S. Robinson, introduction to Eleventh-Century Germany: The Swabian Chronicles, trans. I.S. Robinson 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 18. 
4 McCarthy, Investiture Contest, 7. 
5 Ibid., 124. Henry IV established councils of this movement during his reign. 
6 Richard Landes, “The Fear of an Apocalyptic Year 1000: Augustinian Historiography, Medieval and Modern,”  In 
The Apocalyptic Year 1000: Religious Expectation and Social Change, 950-1050, ed. Richard Landes, Andrew Gow, 
and David C. Van Meer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 258. 
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Appendix A 
The genealogy of the Ottonian royal family, also known as Liudolfings. 
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